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Ashraf: The Reasonableness of the "Reasonable Woman" Standard: An Evaluat

NOTE
THE REASONABLENESS OF THE "REASONABLE
WOMAN" STANDARD: AN EVALUATION OF ITS
USE IN HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT*
INTRODUCTION

Courts have been taking note of sexual harassment in the
workplace and recognizing it as a cause of action since the early
1980s.1 Traditionally, in order to determine whether a cause of action
existed for sexual harassment, courts used the "reasonable person"
standard.2 Recently, however, a number of courts have replaced the
reasonable person standard with the "reasonable woman" standard for
the purpose of determining whether sexual harassment exists in a
particular workplace.3 This Note is concerned with whether the use
of the reasonable woman standard should be continued by courts.
This Note focuses on the use of the reasonable woman standard in
the context of hostile environment sexual harassment claims brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.4 The use of the reasonable
woman standard outside of Title VII sexual harassment cases,5 or

* This Note placed second in the 1992 Essay Contest of the Labor and Employment
Law Section of the New York State Bar Association. An abbreviated version will appear in
N.Y. ST. B.A. LA. & EMPLOYMENT SEr. NEWSL. (New York State Bar Association, New
York, N.Y.), June 1993 (forthcoming).
1. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901-04 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944-45 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
2. See Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 476 (5th Cir. 1989); Rabidue
v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986); Hansel v. Public Serv. Co., 778 F.
Supp. 1126, 1134 (D. Colo. 1991).
3. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Andrews v. Philadelphia,
895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir.
1987); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991);
Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 139 F.R.D. 657, 665 (D. Minn. 1991); Radtke v. Everett,
471 N.W.2d 660, 664 (Mich. CL App. 1991).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. 102-166
§' 1977A, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
5. The use of the reasonable woman standard outside of sexual harassment cases
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quid pro quo sexual harassment cases, will not be addressed.
Critics of the reasonable person standard's use in hostile environment sexual harassment cases argue that men and women have
widely varying perceptions of conduct which constitutes sexual harassment. They argue that since most judges and employers are male,
when they apply a reasonable person standard, they are in effect applying a male-biased standard. Such a standard, it is argued, ignores
the experiences of women, and reinforces the prevailing levels of
sexual harassment. Therefore, they urge the adoption and use of a
reasonable woman standard which would allow courts to consider the
differences between men and women."
This Note attempts to determine whether such a standard is needed, whether it is useful and appropriate in this context, and whether
its use should be continued. Initially, the idea of a reasonable woman
standard seems quite appealing and practical. However, this Note
concludes that the reasonable woman standard should not be used,
and the reasonable person standard should be retained. While arguably
the use of the reasonable woman standard would force courts, or the
triers of fact, to take women's perceptions and experiences into account, ultimately, it will interfere with and retard the achievement of
the goal of Title VII-the elimination of discrimination in the
workplace. The addition of gender to the reasonable person standard
will lead to the addition of other subjective elements, such as race
and ethnicity. Such a subjective standard will cause confusion for,
and unfairly burden, employers who are subject to financial liability
for a violation of Title VII. It will be very difficult for employers to
announce and enforce policies concerning sexual harassment that conform to a subjective, rather than an objective standard. Hence, the
goal of Title VII will become more difficult to achieve.
Part I describes the problem generally. The argument for the
adoption of a reasonable woman standard in hostile environment sexual harassment cases is described. Part II looks for guidance to other
areas of law to see whether a gender-biased reasonable person standard has been used, and if so, in what context. In particular, this part
examines areas of tort law and criminal law which have traditionally
used the objective reasonable person standard and where, arguably,
men and women have different perceptions of conduct which is the

brought under state statutes analogous to Title VII will similarly not be addressed.
6. See infra part I.C. for a detailed description of the argument favoring the adoption
of a reasonable woman standard.
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basis of the cause of action. Notably, the reasonable woman standard
has rarely been used. Part III outlines several reasons why the reasonable person standard should be retained in hostile environment sexual
harassment cases.
I.

THE "REASONABLE WOMAN" STANDARD

A.

Introduction

Courts have been recognizing causes of action for hostile environment sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 since the early 1980s.' The purpose of Title VII is to afford
employees a discrimination-free environment, and therefore engender
equal opportunity for everyone! Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer.... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his[/her]
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin."9
1
issued
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")'
guidelines on sex discrimination in 1980, which have been extensively
referred to and used by the courts in defining and recognizing a
The
cause of action for hostile environment sexual harassment
guidelines state that:

Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of title
VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environ-

7. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901-04 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944-45 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
8. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971); Henson, 682 F.2d at
901; Radtke v. Everett, 471 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Mich. C. App. 1991).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1991).
10. The EEOC was created by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; it became
functional on July 2, 1965. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1991). The EEOC is the agency responsible for enforcing the Civil Rights Act. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34.
11. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986); Henson, 682 F.2d at
903 n.7.
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ment.12
There are two widely accepted categories of sexual harassment.1 3 The first is quid pro quo. This is the type which is described in the EEOC guidelines under section 1604.11 (1) and (2).
Subsection (3) describes the second category, hostile environment
sexual harassment, with which this Note is concerned. In the 1986
case of Meitor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 4 the Supreme Court finally
recognized that hostile environment sexual harassment is a form of
sex discrimination actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. s In so doing, the Court relied on the EEOC guidelines and
determined that non-economic injury, such as psychological harm,
created by a hostile environment was a "term or condition of employment" within the meaning of Title VII. 6
Since Meritor, courts have generally recognized that five elements need to be present before liability for hostile environment sexual harassment will be found. 7 Generally, these are:
(1) the employee was a member of a protected class; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcomed sexual harassment ... ; (3)
the harassment complained of was based upon sex; (4) the charged
sexual harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering with the
plaintiff's work performance and creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment that affected seriously the psychological well-being of8 the plaintiff; and (5) the existence of respondeat
superior liability.
The fourth element is the concern of this Note. "For sexual
harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to 'alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create
an abusive working environment.' 1 9 The inquiry of whether this
element has been fulfilled may be made using an objective standard,
a subjective standard, or by using a gender- or sex-specific objective
standard. An objective standard means that the situation is viewed
from the perspective of the reasonable person to determine if it pro12.
13.
F.2d at
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1980).
See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 618 (6th Cir. 1986); Henson, 682
908 n.18.
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
See id. at 73.
Id. at 65.
See Rabiue, 805 F.2d at 619-20; Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05.
Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 619-20.
Mefitor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904) (alteration in original).
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duced a hostile environment.2' The reasonable person is not given
any of the characteristics of the actual plaintiff; s/he exists independently of the real plaintiff. Under a subjective standard, the situation
is viewed from the perspective of the actual plaintiff.21 The
plaintiff's thoughts, emotions, and state of mind are relevant Under
the gender-specific objective standard, the objective reasonable person
is given the subjective characteristics of the sex or gender of the
plaintiff, so that the situation is viewed from a reasonable woman's
point of view when the plaintiff is a woman.'
It has been decided, and is generally accepted, that an objective
standard should be used to determine whether the conduct is sufficiently pervasive to interfere with the plaintiff's work, altering the
conditions of employment, and producing a hostile or offensive environment.' The reason espoused for not using a subjective standard
is that we need to protect employers from claims of sexual harassment by hypersensitive, idiosyncratic plaintiffs.24 The issue that
courts are still wrestling with is whether the conduct must be viewed
from the viewpoint of a reasonable person, or that of a gender-specific reasonable person, i.e., a reasonable woman.2 The reasonable person standard has been criticized and attacked by many authors, 26 and
it has been repeatedly urged that courts substitute a reasonable woman
standard. 278 In fact, a number of courts have already adopted such a
2
standard.
20. See Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 476 (5th Cir. 1989);
Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620; Hansel v. Public Serv. Co., 778 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (D. Colo.
1991).
21. See, e.g., Guiden v. Southeastern Pub. Serv. Auth., 760 F. Supp. 1171, 1178 (E.D.
Va. 1991); Parrish v. Washington Natl Ins. Co., 1990 WL 165611, "3 (N.D. M11.Oct. 16,
1990).
22. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
23. See King v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 P.2d 533, 537 (7th
Cir. 1990); Andrews v. Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990).
24. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879; Andrews, 898 F.2d at 1483; Note, Sexual Harassment
Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title V/1, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1459 (1984).
25. Of course, if the victim was a man, then the standard used would be the reasonable
man standard. Since the vast majority of sexual harassment claims are brought by female
plaintiffs, for brevity's sake I will refer to the gender-specific reasonable person standard as
the reasonable woman standard throughout the rest of this Note.
26. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1202-09 (1989); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist
Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99
YALE LJ. 1177, 1205-08 (1990).
27. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626, 628 (6th Cir. 1986)
(Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Note, supra note 24, at 1459.
28. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Andrews v. Philadelphia,
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B. Different Perceptions of Men and Women
Numerous authorities29 and several empirical studies suggest
that men and women have different perceptions of what conduct constitutes sexual harassment. In a 1988 report by the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board on the nature and extent of sexual harassment
in the federal government, it was found that where a co-worker was
the offender, only 47% of men defined sexual remarks as sexual harassment, compared with 64% of women; 60% of men defined suggestive looks as sexual harassment, compared to 76% of women; 66%
of men and 76% of women defined pressure for dates as sexual harassment; 67% of men and 84% of women defined letters and calls
as sexual harassment; 82% of men and 92% of women defined deliberate touching as sexual harassment; and 90% of men defined pressure for sexual favors as sexual harassment, compared to 98% of
women." In addition, a study reported in the Harvard Business Review in 1981, found that only 32% of women agreed or partly agreed
that the amount of sexual harassment at work is greatly exaggerated,
compared with 66% of the men.31
University of Arizona professor Barbara Gutek surveyed 1200
men and women for a study of sex in the workplace. Her study confirms the existence of a wide gap in men's and women's definitions
of what constitutes sexual harassment.3 2 Her study reveals that women are much more likely to regard a sexual encounter, verbal or physical, as coercive.33 They are less likely to view such conduct as flattering. While 66% of the men said they would consider a sexual
proposition flattering, only 17% of the women agreed. Conversely,
63% of the women said they would be insulted by a proposition,

895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir.
1987); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991);
Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 139 F.R.D. 657, 665 (D. Minn. 1991); Radtke v. Everett,
471 N.W.2d 660, 664 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
29. See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, .TE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN 163 (1979); Abrams, supra note 26, at 1203; Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 813, 817 (1991).
30. OFFICE OF MERIT REVIEW & STUDIES, U.S. MERITS SYS. PROTECTION BD., SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN FEDERAL GOVERN:ENT: AN UPDATE, 11-21 (1988).
31. See Eliza C. Collins & Timothy B. Blodgett, Sexual Harassment... Some See
It...
Some Won't, HARv. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 76, 81.
32. BARBARA GuTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 43-44, 96-97 (1985).
33. See id. at 43-44.
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compared with 15% of the men who said they would be insulted. 4
C. Argument for the Adoption of the
"Reasonable Woman" Standard
The critics of the reasonable person standard argue that such 3a5
standard is male-biased and ignores the experiences of women.
This view is espoused in spite of the fact that the reasonable person,
as borrowed from negligence literature, is given both male and female
associations.' The argument for the adoption of the sex-specific reasonable person standard is that most employers who are responsible
for creating the hostile environment, and most judges who are responsible for determining whether a hostile environment exists, are male.
Therefore, they have a male perspective of what constitutes sexual
harassment. Consequently, when they apply the reasonable person
standard, they are applying a male-biased standard.3 1 Under this biased standard, conduct which a reasonable woman finds sufficient to
create a hostile environment, but which a reasonable man does not,
will not be found to be prohibited under Title VII. In effect, it is said
that the use of the reasonable person standard carries with it "the risk
of reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimination" in the workplace,
which discrimination Title VII was designed to eliminate.31 Conversely, it is said that the gender- or sex-specific reasonable person
standard allows courts to consider salient sociological differences

34. See id.at 96-97.
35. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Ehrenreich, supra note 26,
at 1207-08.
36. Nancy Ehrenreich suggests that the reasonable person identifies with males and
females, and therefore conveys the idea of mediation and compromise:
While the central figure of the image is male, it nevertheless carries both masculine and feminine associations. Located at home, in the domestic sphere usually
associated with women, the figure is also situated outdoors, in the prototypically
male realm of car repairs, sports, and barbecues. The action he is engaged
in-lawnmowing-aiso conveys mixed messages that suggest a mediating role. On
the one hand, physical labor is usually associated with male virility. On the other
hand, lawnmowing itself is one of those baneful tasks often required (so the ideology goes) of "henpecked" husbands by their wives, and thus could be seen as
evidence of emasculation. In short, associating the "man in his shirtsleeves" with
the "female" world, the symbol feminizes him; associating him with the "male"
world, it preserves his masculinity intact. It presents him as a compromise between
the effeminized man (or femaleness) and the purely masculine one (or maleness),
as a mediator between extremes.
Ehrenreich, supra note 26, at 1211-12 (citation omitted).
37. See Abrams, supra note 26, at 1203.
38. Radtke v. Everett, 471 N.W.2d 660, 664 (Mich. CL App. 1991).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:483

between men and women, 39as well as shield employers from the "hyper-sensitive" complainant.
I"I.

LOOKING FOR AUTHORITATIVE GUIDANCE

A.

Legislative History and the EEOC

Title VII was enacted by Congress with the goal of eliminating
4
discrimination against blacks and other minorities in the workplace. 0
The prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to
Title VII at the last minute on the floor of the House of Representatives.4 ' This was reportedly done in an attempt to defeat its passage.42 Nonetheless, the bill quickly passed as amended. 43 Therefore, there is no legislative history available which would assist the
courts in determining how sexual discrimination or harassment is to
be defined or evaluated.
The EEOC is the agency responsible for enforcing the Civil
Rights Act. 4 In 1988, it issued a notice on sexual harassment. The
notice states that in determining whether harassment is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to create a hostile environment, the harasser's
conduct should be evaluated from the objective standpoint of a reasonable person, i.e., that the trier of fact must adopt the perspective
of a reasonable person's reaction to a similar environment under similar circumstances.45 Patently, the EEOC did not advocate a genderspecific reasonable standard. The EEOC guidelines, "while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.'" The courts that have already adopted a reasonable woman standard did not refer to or discuss the EEOC's use and retention of the reasonable person standard.
They apparently did not use the offered guidance.

39. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
40. See 110 CONG. REC. S6548 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
41. See 110 CONG. REC. H2577-84 (1964).
42. See Estrich, supra note 29, at 816-17; Michelle R. Pierce, Note, Sexual Harassment
and Title
VII-A Better Solution, 30 B.C. L. REv. 1071, 1076 (1989).
43. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
44. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
45. See EEOC, NOTIcE No. 915.035, POLIcY GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUE OF SEXUAL
HARASSMENT 4 (1988).
46. Mertor, 477 U.S. at 65 (citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 124, 141-42
(1976)).
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B.

Other Areas of Law

1. Tort Law
Due to the lack of available legislative history and a conclusive
authoritative determination of whether a gender-specific reasonable
person standard is appropriate in the area of sexual harassment, this
Note turns to other areas of the law. It would be helpful and useful
to see if, and when, it is used in other circumstances, and to see if,
and when, other subjective elements have been given to the reasonable person. This Note directs attention first to tort law. Initially, it
must be noted that although the reasonable person in negligence cases
is given the physical attributes of the plaintiff,47 this is irrelevant to
the analysis in this Note. The advocates of the reasonable woman
standard want the reasonable person in sexual harassment cases to be
given the subjective characteristic of sex on the basis that men and
women have different perceptions. Accordingly, the analysis contained
herein is concerned with situations in which the reasonable person
standard has been altered by the addition of subjective elements in
order to account for the perception, or level of awareness of the actual plaintiff, not for any physical attributes.
Further, in professional negligence or malpractice cases, the defendant is held to possess the knowledge, skill, and care ordinarily
possessed and employed by members of the profession in good standing. 43 This essentially translates into a "reasonable person engaged in
the same profession as plaintiff" standard. Although a subjective element is being added to the objective standard, professional negligence
or malpractice cases are not relevant to this inquiry. In sexual harassment cases, a subjective characteristic of the plaintiff or victim is to
be assigned to the reasonable person; whereas in professional negligence cases, a subjective characteristic of the actor or defendant is
being assigned to the reasonable person. Further, while in sexual harassment cases, the subjective characteristic is based on the varying
perceptions of two groups, in professional negligence cases, the subjective characteristic is based on the varying levels of knowledge and
skill possessed by two groups.49 Hence, this line of cases is not

47.

See W. PAGE KEEON ET AL, PRoSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 175-76

(5th ed. 1984); Warren A. Seavy, Negligence-Subjective or Objective?, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1,
13-17 (1927).

48. See KEETON ET AL, supra note 47, at 187.
49. See id. at 186-87.
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comparable to or useful in this analysis.
This Note analyzes specifically the torts of invasion of privacy
and the infliction of emotional distress because these are both tort
actions which may be brought on the basis of the same conduct for
which a Title VII action may be brought. ° Further, in both of these
tort actions the reasonable person is used to judge or evaluate the
conduct of the offender. This is in contrast to situations in which the
reasonable person is used to evaluate the conduct or reaction of the
injured person or victim. For example, in self-defense cases, the reasonable person is used to evaluate whether the victim's use of force
was justified.
In invasion of privacy cases, the intrusion must be something
which would be highly offensive or objectionable to a reasonable
person of ordinary sensibilities." Courts have consistently used the
objective standard of the reasonable person. There are no reported
cases showing that a gender-specific reasonable person standard has
ever been used.
Similarly, in cases of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, there can be no recovery unless the distress is such
that a reasonable person could not cope with it.52 No instances were
found where a gender-specific reasonable person was used to determine if there could be recovery for the infliction of emotional distress. Moreover, with the exception of one court, all courts that have
considered the tort of infliction of emotional distress have used the
wholly objective standard of a reasonable person, adding no subjective characteristics of the plaintiff. In Plaisance v. Texaco,53 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed a claim

50. See Patricia Linenberger, Whiat Behavior Constitutes Sexual Harassment?,34 LAB. L.
J. 238, 241 (1983).
51. See Yarbray v. Southern Bell, 409 S.E.2d 835, 836 (Ga. 1991); Schoneweis v.
Dando, 435 N.W.2d 666, 669 (Neb. 1989); Hall -v. Hall, 372 S.E.2d 711, 719 (N.C. 1988);
Smith v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 400 S.E.2d 99, 100 (N.C. CL App. 1991); Doe v. Dyer-Goode,
566 A.2d 889, 891 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1976);
KEETON ET AT., supra note 47, at 855-57.
52. See Baker v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 585 So. 2d 804, 806 (Ala. 1991); Daniel v.
Alabama Power Co., 555 So. 2d 162, 164 (Ala. 1989); Schild v. Rubin, 283 Cal. Rptr. 533,
537 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Mellaly v. Eastern Kodak Co., 597 A.2d 846, 848 (Conn. 1991);
Bethel v. Van Stone, 817 P.2d 188, 194 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991); McGrath v. Fahey, 533
N.E.2d 806, 809 (Il. 1988); Stubbs v. North Memorial Medical Ctr., 448 N.W.2d 78, 81
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Foster v. McDevitt, 511 N.E.2d 403, 407 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986);
Todd v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 321 S.E.2d 602, 609 (S.C. CL App.
1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1976).
53. 937 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1991).
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by a tugboat captain for the negligent infliction of emotional distress
5
under the Federal Employers Liability Act ("FELA")/Jones Act. 4
Although the court applied a "reasonable person, normally constituted" standard, it noted that the reasonable person in a maritime case is
a "far heartier breed" than in other cases.' The court turned the
wholly objective standard into a somewhat subjective "reasonable
seaman" standard. In so doing, the court seems to be suggesting that
reasonable persons and reasonable seamen have different perceptions
or impressions of what conduct would cause emotional distress.
The actual reason the court gave the reasonable person in emotional distress cases brought under the FELA/Jones Act a tougher
constitution than that of a reasonable person was to restrict the liability of vessel owners. It was not to account for their different
comprehensions, awarenesses, or perceptions of conduct which would
cause emotional distress. By allowing recovery, the Fifth Circuit became one of only two circuits to allow recovery for purely emotional
injury under the FELA/Jones Act.' In an earlier case, Gaston v.
57 the Fifth
Flowers Transportation,
Circuit noted that basing the imposition of damages on an employer on factors which are entirely
incidental to the operation of the vessel and which bear little or no
relationship to the safety of the venture is random and wayward. The
court said that such an imposition of damages serves in no way to
advance the major subsidiary purpose of affording such remedies to
seamen under the FELA/Jones Act-to hold out incentives to their
employers to reduce dangers and to operate safely.58 It seems that
the Court of Appeals had the same concern of a purposeless extension of employer liability in mind when it stated that a reasonable
seaman was of a heartier breed than the reasonable person in nonmaritime infliction of emotional distress cases. The court noted in
Plaisance that it wanted a rule which allowed recovery for true, significant mental injuries. The court also said that it was mindful of the
three considerations limiting recovery for emotional injury: (1) mental

54. The Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920) (current version at 46 U.S.C. app. § 688
(1988)), provides, in part, that "[any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course
of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law." The Federal
Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988), is incorporated by reference into the
Jones Act.

55.
56.
57.
58.

Plaisance, 937 F.2d at 1010 n.7.
Id. at 1012 (Jones, J., dissenting).
866 F.2d 816 (5th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 820.
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injury is often temporary and relatively clear, (2) there is a danger
that mental claims will be falsified, and (3) there is a perceived unfairness in imposing liability where the injury is a remote consequence of the wrongful act.59
While wanting to allow recovery for genuine injury, the court
did not want to extend the liability of vessel owners so as to have
them pay in situations where they could not have controlled or reduced the danger which caused the injury. Instead of tinkering with
the traditional reasonable person standard to achieve its goal, the
court should have found and used another mechanism for achieving
the balance it desired between allowing recovery for authentic claims
and protecting employers from excess liability.
Notably, after hearing the case en bane, the Fifth Circuit held
that the facts of the case were such as to make it unnecessary for the
court to decide whether the Jones Act permits recovery for purely
emotional injuries.' The court disavowed its previous holding and
instead reaffirmed its decision in Gaston 6 In Gaston, the court had
denied recovery for a purely emotional injury. It is also noteworthy
that no other circuit followed the Fifth Circuit's earlier lead in the
adoption of such a nonsensical standard. Hence, the reasonable seaman standard seems to have no present applicability. It does not offer
useful guidance for determining whether a reasonable woman standard
should be used in sexual harassment cases. It seems that in Plaisance,
the court created the reasonable seaman standard in order to limit the
liability of vessel owners, not to account for differences in perceptions of seamen and non-seamen of conduct that causes emotional
distress.
2. Criminal Law
In criminal law, the reasonable woman standard is largely absent.
Although it has been rejected by nearly every court,62 in Washington
v. Wanrow,63 the Supreme Court of Washington allowed the use of
a reasonable woman standard in a self-defense instruction to the jury.
In reviewing the self-defense instruction that had been given in the
second degree murder conviction of a woman, the court determined

59. Plaisance, 937 F.2d at 1010.
60. Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc., 966 F.2d 166, 167 (5th Cir. 1992).
61. Id.
62. See, eg., People v. Washington, 130 Cal. Rptr. 96, 98 (Cal. CL App. 1976); Now
Jersey v. McClain, 591 A.2d 652, 656 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1991)
63. 559 P.2d 548 (Wash. 1977).
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that the defendant "was entitled to have the jury consider her actions
in light of her own perceptions of the situation, including those perceptions which were the product of our nation's 'long and unfortunate
history of sex discrimination."' 4 Additionally, some courts have
allowed expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome in order to
assist the jury in determining the reasonableness of the use of, and
degree of, force used in a case involving recognized circumstances of
self-defense. 65
Both the acceptance of a reasonable woman standard in a selfdefense instruction in Washington v. Wanrow, and in the use of testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome, the woman's perception is being used to judge and evaluate her own conduct, i.e., whether her use of force was justified. Therefore, the analysis of those
cases is inapplicable in hostile environment sexual harassment cases
where the woman's perception would be used to judge or evaluate the
harasser's conduct. Hence, these cases cannot be used as authoritative
guidance.
It is helpful to look specifically at situations in the criminal
context where a reasonable woman's perception has been used to
judge the offender's/aggressor's actions. An example of such a situation is the use of the reasonable woman standard in determining
whether force was used in rape. Notably, no court has adopted the
reasonable woman standard in evaluating the alleged rapist's use of
force. Additionally, no court has used the reasonable woman standard
to evaluate the offender's/aggressor's conduct in any other area of
criminal law where a woman is the victim. This remains true despite
the fact that feminist scholars in the area of criminal law have urged
advocates and judges to adopt the perspective of the woman in formulating and adjudicating the elements of a crime.'
From the analysis of the use of a reasonable woman standard in
criminal law and tort law, it is apparent that courts insist on holding
on to a wholly objective reasonable person standard and have never
attributed the subjectiveness of gender to the objective reasonable
person. If a subjective standard is not allowed in other areas of the
law in which reasonable men and reasonable women would arguably
have different perceptions, then there seems to be no justification for
allowing a partially subjective standard in evaluating sexual harass-

64. Md at 559 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)).
65. See 31A AM. JUR. 2D Battered Woman Syndrome § 195 (1989).

66. See Abrarms, supra note 26, at 1206 n.103.
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ment.

III.

RETAINING THE OBJECIV

A.

"REASONABLE PERSON"

Reasons Supporting Retention

There are strong reasons supporting the retention of an objective
reasonable person standard in Title VII hostile environment cases for
making the determination of whether certain behavior is violative or
prohibited. The use of the reasonable woman standard outside Title
VII hostile environment sexual harassment cases is not being addressed here.
First, the elimination of discrimination in the workplace, a goal
of Title VII, cannot be realized if prohibited conduct is not clearly
defined.67 Prohibited conduct needs to be clearly defined so that
people, specifically employers who are the ones actually subject to
financial liability under Title VII, can shape the behavior of their employees by effectuating company policies which conform to that standard. The clearest standard of all is a wholly objective standard. By
adding subjective elements to the standard more confusion is created
for employers subject to financial liability, for employees/coworkers
who are the potential offenders, and for judges.
In discussing the objective theory, Oliver Wendell Holmes noted
that "[i]f . . . 'the actual state of the parties' minds' is relevant, then
each litigated case must become an extended factual inquiry into what
was 'intended,' 'meant,' 'believed,' and so on."68 However, he went
on to say that "[i]f . . . we can restrict ourselves to the 'externals'
(what the parties 'said' or 'did'), then the factual inquiry will be
much simplified and in time can be dispensed with altogether as the
courts accumulate precedents about recurring types of permissible and
impermissible 'conduct."'" In the same way, if a wholly objective
standard is used in sexual harassment cases, courts may quickly develop and accumulate precedent about which conduct is prohibited. In
so doing, they will be offering greatly needed guidance to employers.
Arguably, even with the use of a less than objective standard, a body
of precedent setting boundaries for which conduct is permissible and
which is impermissible may eventually develop. However, it will

67. See Nancy Brown, Note, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: Clarifying the Standards
of Hostile Working Environment Sexual Harassment, 25 Hous. L. REV. 441, 448-49 (1988).
68. GRANT GIL.MOW, THE DEATH oF CONTRAcT 42 (1974).

69. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol21/iss2/5

14

Ashraf: The Reasonableness of the "Reasonable Woman" Standard: An Evaluat
19921

THE 'REASONABLE WOMAN" STANDARD

develop much more slowly. The use of a subjective standard would
produce inconsistency in the results and the conclusions reached by
the courts, thereby creating confusion. The same conduct while found
to be permissible under the use of a subjective standard by one court
may be found to be impermissible by the use of a subjective standard
by another court. As a result, employers will not have guidance on
what conduct they should prohibit.
Second, there is a problem of logical extension of the principle
to other areas. If the reasonable woman standard is accepted in order
to reflect the fact that men and women have such divergent views of
what constitutes sexual harassment, then the same ought to hold true
for a black plaintiff with regard to racial harassment. It may be argued that because of the different socialization experiences that blacks
and whites have in America, they have very different perceptions of
conduct that may constitute a hostile environment based on racial
harassment. This seems to lead to the conclusion that the conduct
must be viewed from the perspective of a "reasonable black person"
in a hostile environment racial harassment action brought by a black
plaintiff under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
This is the very conclusion that a federal district court came to
recently in analyzing a claim for racial harassment in Harris v. International Paper Co.7" Although the claim was brought under the
Maine Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), the court ruled that Title VII
would be used as persuasive authority in interpreting the MHRA
since the M-RA was the state analogue to Title VI. 7 The court
first recognized that in the First Circuit, the reasonable woman standard was the correct one to be used in a Title VII sexual harassment
claim. The court went on to say:
To give full force to ... [the] recognition of the differing perspectives which exist in our society, the standard for assessing the
unwelcomeness and pervasiveness of conduct and speech must be
founded on a fair concern for the different social experiences of
men and women in the case of sexual harassment, and of white
Americans, and black Americans in the case of racial harassment... [l]nstances of racial violence... which might appear to
white observers as mere 'pranks' are, to black observers, evidence
of threatening, pervasive attitudes closely tied with racial jokes,
comments or nonviolent conduct which white observers are more

70. 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me. 1991).
71. Id. at 1511.
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likely to dismiss as non-threatening isolated incidents.... Since the
concern of Title VII and the MHRA is to redress the effects of
conduct and speech on their victims, the fact finder must 'walk a
mile in the victim's shoes' to understand these effects and how they
should be remedied. In sum, the appropriate standard to be applied
in this hostile environment racial harassment case is that of a reasonable black person?2
A federal district court in Arizona agreed with the court in Harris and adopted the same standard. In Stingley v. Arizona,7 3 the
plaintiff, an African American woman, brought suit under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act for hostile environment sexual and racial harassment.74 The court first noted that in Ellison v. Brady, the Ninth Circuit held that "the proper reference for evaluating the 'severity and
pervasiveness' of the harassment is from the perspective of the reasonable victim of the same gender." 5 The court said that the reasoning in Ellison "may be applied seamlessly to racist environment
claims .....

The court concluded that "[tlhe proper perspective

from which to evaluate the hostility of the environment is the 'reasonable person of the same gender and race or color' standard.""
Apparently, this standard is catching on rapidly.
The next logical step would be to argue that the conduct in a
hostile environment claim brought under section 703 of Title VII
based on religious harassment must be viewed from the perspective of
the reasonable Muslim, Jewish, Catholic (or other religion of plaintiff)
person, and in a hostile environment claim based on national origin
harassment, it must be viewed from the perspective of the reasonable
Pakistani, Japanese, Mexican (or some other national origin) person.
A major problem that must be addressed by the courts is deciding or drawing the line as to which characteristics of the plaintiff are
to be given to the reasonable person. The court in Harris stated that
the appropriate standard to be applied is that from the protected group

72. Id. at 1515-16 (citations omitted).
73. 796 F. Supp. 424 (D. Ariz. 1992).
74. Id. at 428.
75. Id.
76. ld.
77. Id. It is not quite clear whether the court means that hostile environment sexual
harassment must be evaluated using the reasonable person of the same gender, and that hostile environment racial harassment must be evaluated using the reasonable person of the same

race, or whether the court meant that any hostile environment claim brought under Title VII
must be evaluated using the reasonable person of the same gender and race or color standard,
regardless of whether a sexual, racial, or national origin harassment claim is brought
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of which the alleged victim is a member.7" This suggests that the
only subjective characteristic to be ascribed to the reasonable person
is the characteristic of the plaintiff on the basis of which the harassment is being claimed. For example, in the case of sexual harassment,
the sex of the plaintiff should be ascribed to the reasonable person,
and in the case of national origin harassment, the national origin of
the plaintiff should be ascribed to the reasonable person. However,
there is no rationale for drawing the line here.
If the very reason put forth for the allowance of a gender-specific reasonable person standard is that men and women have widely
divergent perceptions of conduct which constitutes sexual harassment,
then any time a group to which the plaintiff belongs, and the group
to which s/he does not belong (based on a certain characteristic) have
widely divergent perceptions of such conduct, the standard used
should account for the difference in perceptions. For example, a study
reported in the Harvard Business Review found the existence of a
difference in perception of men and women of sexual harassment and
also found a difference in perception of sexual harassment between
top level management and lower level management.7 9 While only
forty-four percent of lower level management agreed or partially
agreed that sexual harassment at work is greatly exaggerated, sixtythree percent of the top level management so agreed or partly
agreed."0 This difference in perception ought to be similarly reflected
in the standard used to evaluate the conduct.8" If the plaintiff bringing the sexual harassment action was a lower level female manager,
then the standard used to determine whether the conduct created a
hostile environment should be a "reasonable woman who is a lower
level manager." Similarly, perceptions of sexual, racial, or any other
kind of harassment may be found to differ with varying socio-economic levels of the plaintiff. This should be reflected and accounted
for in the standard as well. For example, if such a difference is
found, then for a black person from a high socio-economic level
bringing an action under section 703 for a hostile environment based
on racial harassment, the standard used should be that of a "reason-

79. Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1516 (D. Me. 1991).
79. See Collins & Blodgett, supra note 31, at 81, 85.
80. See id. at 81.
81. The determination of whether two groups have divergent perceptions presents a
problem. It remains to be decided how wide the divergence has to be before a separate standard is assigned, and what kinds of proof will be deemed adequate to show the existence of
the divergence.
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able black person of a high socio-economic level."
As can be seen, if we follow the reasonable woman standard to
its logical progressive end, we will likely run into a great deal of
difficulty. Inevitably, we will end up with a wholly or greatly subjective standard. As stated previously, the subjective standard is not
workable in Title VII sexual harassment claims. It will not set forth
the clear guidelines that people need in this area in order to conform
their conduct to that which is not prohibited. Furthermore, judges
cannot be expected to keep track of and understand the morass of
perspectives involved.' Can an American, white, male judge comprehend what a reasonable Arab would find to constitute a hostile
environment based on national origin? It is difficult to accept or even
imagine that a judge can truly be certain that while certain conduct
would not be offensive enough to create a racial harassment hostile
environment for a reasonable white person, it would be for a reasonable black person. We cannot be certain that a judge can readily
distinguish between what a reasonable woman would find offensive,
as compared with a reasonable man. We cannot assume that a judge
will be able to grasp and comprehend, much less be able to apply,
the standards using numerous perspectives. Undoubtedly, there will be
great chaos.
Third, assuming it is accepted that men and women have sufficiently differing perspectives of what constitutes sexual harassment, it
remains unclear how the reasonable woman standard accounts for the
different perspectives. The premise underlying the reasoning of why
the reasonable person standard is unusable is that this standard is
male-biased.83 This is said to be so because, since most judges and
employers (the people judging and allowing existence of the hostile
environment) are male, in applying the standard of the reasonable
person they are applying the reasonable male standard." If male
judges are now forced to apply a reasonable woman standard, how
can we be so sure that they are now applying a reasonable woman's
perception rather than a male-biased view of what, the reasonable
woman's perception is?
It should also be noted that the argument for the adoption of the
reasonable woman standard is not as compelling as it was before the

82. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 627 (6th Cir. 1986).
83. See GUTEK, supra note 32; Abrams, supra note 26; Ehrenreich, supra note 26.
84. See Abrams, supra note 26, at 1203.
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passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.5 Under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,86 a trial by jury was generally denied for Title VII actions." The rationale for the denial was that only equitable, as opposed to legal remedies were available under Title VII, and juries are
not provided for the resolution of equitable claims."8 The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 has changed this. Now, compensatory and punitive damages (i.e., legal remedies) are available to a plaintiff bringing
an action under section 703 for sexual harassment if the plaintiff can
show that the harassment was intentional.8 9 This means that where
these legal remedies are sought, a trial by jury is available. Therefore,
although a trial by jury is not available in every sexual harassment
action brought under Title VII, its availability has been significantly
opened. The proponents of the reasonable woman standard maintain
that the reasonable person standard is male-biased because most of
the judges who apply it are male. Since it cannot be presumed that a
jury for a sexual harassment case will be mostly male, in cases where
a right to a trial by jury is available, it cannot be said that the application of the reasonable person standard will be an application of a
male-biased standard. Presumably, there will be women on the jury
who will prevent the application of a male-biased standard.
The main criticism of the reasonable person standard has been
that it fails to account for the differences in men's and women's
perspectives. It is argued that the reasonable person standard assumes
that there is some view of sexual harassment that we are all likely to
share."' However, the same can be said of the reasonable woman
standard, i.e., it assumes a view of sexual harassment that all women
are likely to share.9' The studies and surveys show otherwise. For
example, in its 1988 study, the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board

85. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000oe-17 (1988).
87. See Harmon v. May Broadcasting Co., 583 F.2d 410, 410 (8th Cir. 1978); Slack v.
Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1975); James v. International Broadcasting Co., 737
F. Supp. 1420, 1429 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Taylor v. Rhode Island Dept. of Mental Health Retardation & Hosps., 736 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D.R.I. 1990); Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 645 F. Supp. 363,
366 (S.D. Ohio 1986); An-Ti Chai v. Michigan Technological Univ., 493 F. Supp. 1137,
1144 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Schofield v. Stetson, 459 F. Supp. 998, 999 (M.D. Ga. 1978). But
see Beesley v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. Ala. 1989) (allowing a jury
trial under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
88. See Harmon, 583 F.2d at 410; Taylor, 736 F. Supp. at 16-17; An-Ti Chai, 493 F.
Supp. at 1144.
89. See § 1977A, 105 Stat. at 1072-73.
90. See Abrams, supra note 26, at 1202.
91. See Ehrenreich, supra note 26, at 1214-19.
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reported that sixty-four percent of the women defined suggestive
looks from a co-worker as sexual harassment. 2 This necessarily
means that thirty-six percent of the women did not define such conduct as sexual harassment. Women cannot be considered a homogeneous group. They all have different experiences, views, and perceptions from each other. The criticism that the reasonable person standard assumes that people share a common view of something will be
true of any objective standard. However, a subjective standard is
unusable in this area. Therefore, an objective standard must be used.
B.

Balancing Employer/Employee Rights.

The definition of "reasonableness" as applied in tort law should
be carried forward to give content to the reasonable person as s/he is
used in sexual harassment cases. There exists the objection that the
goal of tort law and the goal of Title VII are too different from each
other and therefore do not allow for the carrying over of the reasonable person standard. Simply stated, it might be argued that the goal
of tort law is to enforce prevailing norms of conduct in society,
whereas the goal of Title VII is to reform practices which are considered to be the norm in society. However, upon a close examination
of the two areas of law, this Note concludes that this is not so.
While the goal of Title VII is to eliminate discriminatory barriers
in employment93 and to afford "equality of opportunity,"' it is not
to drastically change the thinking of society overnight. Title VII seeks
to strike "a delicate balance between employer and employee
rights." 95 While Title VII seeks to remedy individual wrongs, it does
not intend to punish employers.' This balance would be upset and
employers would be punished if it was found that Title VII prohibited
all offensive conduct from the workplace since the employer is the
one subject to financial responsibility for failing to prevent the occurrence of the conduct. Therefore, it cannot be said that Title VII was
designed to bring about "a magical transformation in the social mores
of American workers." 97

92. See OFFICE OF MERIT REVIEW & STUDIES, supra note 30, at 14.
93. See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
94. Bridgeport Guardians v. Bridgeport, 933 F.2d 1140, 1145 (2d Cir. 1991).
95. Coleman v. Domino's Pizza, 728 F. Supp. 1528, 1532 (1990) (citing Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 182 n.4 (1989)).
96. See Kilgo v. Bowman Transp. Inc., 789 F.2d 859, 876 (lth Cir. 1986).
97. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Rabidue v.
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Similarly, tort law achieves a balance between the rights of people in society by affording compensation for injuries sustained by one
person as the result of the conduct of another.98 Tort law bases liability upon conduct which is socially unreasonable." It is undisputed
that what is socially acceptable and unacceptable changes with time.
"The reasonable [person in tort law] is not a static creation; his[/her]
conduct necessarily varies with the circumstances and inevitably will
vary as changing morality affects jurors' [and judges'] views of what
[s/]he would do."" °
The objective reasonable person standard should be used in Title
VII since it is a mechanism for balancing the differing considerations
of employers and employees in the workplace. If the reasonable person is given subjective characteristics, this delicate balance is destroyed. In negligence, "[t]he standard of conduct which the community demands must be an external and objective one, rather than the
individual judgment... of the particular actor, and it must be . . .
the same for all persons, since the law can have no favorites.""'
The law cannot have any favorites under Title VII either.
It bears emphasis that the community which determines the conduct expected of the reasonable person is a community made up of
women and men, not just of men. Furthermore, arguing that the trier
of fact factors his/her bias into account when evaluating certain conduct has never been said to be a sufficient reason for discarding the
objective standard. In any situation, under any given set of circumstances, the triers of fact and the litigants are bound to have differences, whether these differences are cultural, racial, economic, religious, or others."° We cannot control the biases a trier of fact may
.bring with herself or himself. Also, even in the application of a subjective standard, a trier of fact may still consider his/her own biases
and perspectives.

Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984)).
98. See KEETON ET AL, supra note 47, at 6.
99. See Id.
100. Osbourne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Reasonable Man of Negligence Law: A Health
Report on the 'Odious Creature," 23 OKLA. L. REv. 410, 420 (1970).
101. See KEETON Er AL, supra note 47, at 173-74.
102. See David 1. Gedrose, Workplace Sexual Harassment: The Ninth Circuit's Reasonable Woman Standard and Employer Remedial Actions in Hostile Environment Claims Following Ellison v. Brady, 28 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 151, 170 (1991).
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CONCLUSION

This Note concludes that the use of the reasonable woman standard in hostile environment sexual harassment cases brought under
Title VII should be discontinued. The addition of gender to the objective reasonable person standard will ultimately lead to a wholly or
highly subjective standard. Such a subjective standard is unworkable

in this area.
The objective reasonable person should be retained in Title VII
hostile environment sexual harassment cases so that a clear, consistent
body of law and standards can be established to guide people in their
behavior. If so, eventually Title VII's purpose can be realized.

Saba Ashraf*

* The author wishes to express her gratitude to Professor Robin Charlow of Hofstra
University School of Law for all of her encouragement and assistance.
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